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They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented. 
K A R L M A R X , The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
I. A p p r o a c h i n g the Younger M a n 
I N 1988, S T E P H E N G R A Y published his second novel, Time of Our 
Darkness. The narrative is ostensibly the story told by Pete, a gay 
white male school teacher, about a sexual relationship he has 
with a thirteen-year-old black male student named Disley. The 
back cover blurb suggests that "when Disley turns up at Pete's 
house one day with a suitcase, it is to br ing his white 'master' face 
to face with the di lemma of how to live honestly, compassion-
ately, and courageously i n a country torn apart by the violence of 
apartheid." This blurb is negotiating the distance between a 
marginal story and a mass market, attempting to frame and sell 
Gray's text as an ethical tale. What this blurb also suggests— 
perhaps unconsciously—is the central symbolic value of Disley 
as a constituent of Pete's tale. The front cover blurb of the mass-
market edition quotes a review in which Kurt Vonnegut contends 
that the novel describes "real lives of South Africans . . . alive and 
personal." The i r o n y — w h i c h provides the central focus of this 
paper—is that by the end of the novel Disley is not "alive," and at 
no time has Pete, the first-person narrator, allowed us to fathom 
how "real" Disley's "personal" life is. 
In the first chapter of Gray's novel, Pete admits that he has "the 
need to chop everything down to fit" (2). Ostensibly he is talking 
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about his "hydrangea bush," but immediately following his ex-
pression of this concern, he finds a "black chi ld at the gate . . . 
[and he goes] to dispose of whatever it was" ( 2 ). To understand 
the production and control of this black boy within a system of 
representation, it is necessary to examine h i m as a discourse 
within the novel. As Edward Said has convincingly argued, "with-
out examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly 
understand the enormously systematic discipline by which Euro-
pean culture was able to manage—and even produce — [the 
Orient] politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scien-
tifically, and imaginatively" ( Orientalism 3). This younger man as 
an object of discourse is subject to a similar form of "systematic 
discipl ine" with which he is managed and produced. T h r o u g h a 
discourse analysis of the black boy, as younger man and as "event" 
i n Gray's novel, this study attempts to reveal how he functions in 
the older man's economy. 
My focus on discourse should not imply that the black boy 
outside Pete's gate is only an image, a creation without a corre-
sponding reality. This essay's focus is not to flesh out that reality, 
but only to suggest where there are traces of that reality. What 
must preface this study is the assertion that the younger-man 
figure is always already eroticized and controlled because he can 
be; he is spoken for and represented because the older man is 
able to appropriate h i m for his discourse. This assertion does not 
condone Pete's — the older man's—fantasy, the authority that 
operates within this text; it only resists the i l lusion of any absolute 
authority. Authority does not naturally and completely reside 
within the older man, though he invariably seeks to make himself 
the "author." 
II. Parastathentism 
The image of the younger man as an object of beauty and as a 
catalyst in "homoerotic" and "gay" texts is so exhaustively repre-
sented i n the Western canon that a comprehensive study is not 
only unimaginable but undesirable. What proves more produc-
tive is an approach that looks at what Foucault terms "events"— 
significant moments i n which the figure of the younger man 
appears and functions. "Events" together form what Foucault 
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calls a "statement" wherein the "archive . . . is the system of [the 
statement's] functioning. Far from being that which unifies ev-
erything that has been said i n the great confused murmur of a 
discourse, far f rom being only that which ensures that we exist in 
the midst of preserved discourse, [the archive] is that which 
differentiates discourses i n their multiple existence and specifies 
them i n their own durat ion" (129). 
Said, whose study of Orientalism as a discursive system of 
power is based upon Foucault's notion of the archive, candidly 
admits that he "depends neither upon an exhaustive catalogue 
of texts dealing with the Orient nor u p o n a clearly delimited set 
of texts, authors, and ideas that together make up the Orientalist 
canon" (Orientalism 4). Similarly, I am interested less i n delimit-
ing a canon than i n exposing a systematic practice of representa-
tion which may be said to constitute an archive, or a system of 
knowledge. T h r o u g h an archaeological process, I examine "dis-
courses as practices specified i n the element of the archive" 
(Foucault 131) of the younger man/older man. 
Terminology itself could become a site of struggle for author-
ity, given the relative nature of terms like "younger" and "older" 
man. Physiology is often a determining factor i n the sciences for 
differentiating between boyhood, puberty, and manhood, but 
socially these borders can be concealed, occluded, or trans-
posed. The term for difference between "younger" and "older" 
man could productively be configured as access to print, the 
potential for authorship. It is not one's age which admits one to 
the archive that is the focus of this study; it is instead the degree 
to which one can be produced and controlled by the older man. 
To call these older men "pedophiles" or "pederasts" would 
be inaccurate. A more useful term can be derived from Ken 
Dowden's description of the rituals which took place i n ancient 
Crete, i n which a younger man is "k idnapped" by an older man. 
H e points out that Strabo called these young men "parastathentes 
. . . [or] stood-by . . . [or] k idnapped" (114). T o "capture" the 
younger man i n discourse, then, could be called an act of para-
stathentism, an action perpetrated u p o n a younger other, regard-
less of specific age. 
80 R O B E R T W. G R A Y 
III. Pete, His Hydrangea, and Linguistic Authority 
The younger man in Gray's novel, Disley, is initially little more 
than a black student who has come to Pete's school "on a schol-
arship f rom an educational improvement scheme indirectly 
funded by the U S Congress" (1). H e is introduced before the 
reader is made aware of Pete's own difficult domestic situation, 
and before any crisis seems evident in the teacher's life. Disley 
arrives at Pete's house without parents. W h e n Pete drives h im 
home, he notes that "[c]ertainly there was no one at home to 
receive their curiously named son" (12). Disley returns to Pete's 
house the next day and proffers what Pete calls "the famous 
note" from Disley's mother: 
Master: 
It is no good for my chile in the township. My husband he is in single 
hostel. Myself I am wekking in Prospect. There is trouble trouble 
Master. M y chile must keep i n Saints Pols unti l everything is finish. H e 
must follow a good education. L o o k after my chile unti l everything is 
finish. M y chile says to me you are a good Master. I have a good jersey 
for h i m . H u m b l e greet ings— 
Magdalena Mashinin i (Mrs) (30) 
Pete reads this le t ter—a note of permission — that essentially 
gives h i m authority over Disley, and interprets it as a discursive 
act of resignation, the price Disley and his mother will pay for his 
protection and assimilation. 
This letter is also the first indication of Disley's own linguistic 
difference, a difference that must be erased. Language, both 
written and oral , plays a significant role in Disley's identity as 
reconstituted under Pete's tutelage; through this reconstitution 
(a product of the efforts of both the student and the teacher) 
Disley aspires to an acceptable "whiteness." For what Pete teaches 
at St. Paul's is A f r i k a a n s — t h e language of apartheid—though 
he would prefer to teach English. What he fails to see, how-
ever, is that Engl ish is equally the language of colonization and 
apartheid. 
Pete is the obvious dispenser of discursive authority in the 
novel, and his render ing of non-standard English becomes the 
mark of marginality i n the world he represents. Trudi , a German 
immigrant who has taught for several decades at the school, 
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becomes another linguistic type of social displacement, as seen 
in these two examples: "Zis one you must read, I got it out zpecilly 
for you" (117); ' "Zis wil l be a story very after your heart,' Trudi 
continued, 'because it is about a brovezzor who vails in love vid a 
tart, and all his bubils tease h i m , you know how they are'" (117). 
Even Pete's transcription of a soldier's stutter emphasizes the 
young man's speech impediment: "Th-that's jus t—grazing for 
cattle" (197); "Th-that's M o u n t Balmoral" (198); "Next week I 
go-go" (198). But perhaps the person whose speech is most 
marginalized by Pete is the young man who rivals h i m for Andre's 
affection. Prince's English is imperfect and often laced with 
Afrikaans exclamations, and his references to English-speaking 
culture are mocked. W h e n he is trying to explain what was stolen 
when the house was robbed, he tells Pete that "they only took 
Gone in the Wind and Officer or a Gentleman" (225). Charac-
teristically, Pete uses the accents and linguistic errors of others to 
assert the superiority of his class, race, culture, and intellect—his 
positions of privilege as dispenser of discursive authority. 
Pete's narrative attention to locution only lapses with Disley, 
and this suggests a desire to erase Disley's "difference." Disley's 
accent and his "poor" English are recorded throughout the first 
chapter, though not beyond the point where Pete is drawn to 
him. W h e n Disley is reciting a speech from Macbeth, Pete reveals 
that there is a difference between the transcribed version of 
Disley's speech and what Pete is hearing: "There were areas of 
Disley no teacher would reach. 'What bloody man is that?' H e 
announced it l ike 'Wet very men is there-tY There was a long way 
for us to go" (64). In less than six months, however, this thirteen-
year-old will be capable of sophisticated utterance. The irregular 
evidence of Disley's obscured parole wil l always undermine and 
throw into question Pete's translations. 
W h e n Pete says that "[t]his was no longer teaching, but a 
mutual, never exhausted jo int monologue" ( 124), he reveals 
more than he might have intended. Ostensibly he is saying that 
he no longer has to lecture Disley and is implying that they are 
involved i n a dialogue. But he substitutes "joint monologue" for 
"dialogue," and this substitution reveals the hybrid form of locu-
tion that Pete has constructed for Disley. Just as he transcribes 
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others' accents, linguistic errors, and speech impediments to 
illustrate their inferiority, so must he create a new locution for 
Disley, a "joint monologue." In his role as a language instructor, 
Pete, the lover framing the beloved, constructs a white mask 
for Disley, re-casting h i m i n his own image, subsuming h i m into 
his "monologue," which is redeemed by "joint" expression. 
IV. Imitation and Fluid Colour 
Before Disley met Pete, he had been left to flounder at the 
school, receiving little help, and, as Jenny Carter his teacher 
observes, if he is to fail "[t]here's plenty more where he comes 
f r o m " ( 2 2 ). Disley is an almost valueless commodity under South 
African Apartheid, a system of oppression that values most those 
colonized subjects who imitate the colonizing subject. Pete ar-
gues that St. Paul's is an international school, that it will have 
students from all over the world, but there is no contingency for 
cultural specificity, or other ways of learning. The international 
focus of St. Paul's is only a disguise for the assimilation expected 
of their students. Frantz Fanon describes this desire for assimila-
tion, f rom the colonial subject's point of view, i n Black Skins, White 
Masks: 
Every colonized people . . . finds itself face to face with the language 
of the civilized nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country. 
The colonized is elevated above hisjungle status in proportion to his 
adoption of the mother country's cultural standards. He becomes 
whiter as he renounces his blackness. (18) 
This elevation i n status through mimesis is what is offered to 
Disley at St. Paul's and, at least initially, within his relationship 
with Pete. U n d e r Pete's influence, Disley's status at the school 
changes, and he is "seen less as a retarded black and more as a 
brainy white" ( 18o). Pete's influence has fathered a white mask 
for Disley. 
When Disley wins an award for scholastic improvement at the 
end of the school year, Pete and Jenny decide that it is not only 
Disley's parents who are generally unsuitable for St. Paul's: 
We reviewed the problem of Disley's real parents. To put it uncharita-
bly, we could only think that should the Mashininis pitch up for 
speech day Disley would be done for. To him it would be an excmciat-
S T E P H E N G R A Y ' S " T I M E O F O U R D A R K N E S S " 83 
ing social embarrassment, to them an otherworldly bafflement. Were 
the chairman of the school trustees to approach his mother with a 
compliment, and she just to stare at him, the name of Mashinini 
would be mud. Were the managing director of Barlow-Rand to take 
his father aside and learn that all he felt a growing lad needed was 
occasional clysters with a cow's horn, Disley would no longer be able 
to hold his head up in civilized society. (232-33) 
Pete degrades the Mashininis and their cultural difference i n 
order to consolidate his own colonial position. 
In a scene just pr ior to this, Pete has already justified 
his prejudice against the unassimilated blacks by making Mrs. 
Mashinini appear beast-like i n her lack of comprehension and 
muteness. Jenny says she feels sympathy for "poor Disley, having 
that l u m p of vagueness to haul around" (187). She follows this 
with other derogatory remarks, all aimed at Mrs. Mashinini 's size: 
"That's why they're so fat! Because with the consumer boycott, they 
gorge themselves thick in their madams' kitchens!" 
"Where does a black baby sleep?" I slipped in. 
"And sick it up for their offspring—like pelicans!" (187) 
The third-person pronouns and possessive pronouns (they, 
their) mark a racial difference that reduces the women (partic-
ularly Disley's mother) to stereotyped Others. But Jenny cannot 
conceal her own racist motives: "Jealous. That's what I am. That 
h u g e — b l o b — h a s a chi ld like Disley, and I—we. . . . You don't 
have a chi ld , I d o n ' t — a n d she has that total little black gem" 
(187-88). A t best, Pete does not disagree, and at worst he offers 
the first l ine of a racist joke ("Where does a black baby sleep?"). 
W h e n Jenny says, they "sick [the food] up for their offspring," he 
gives himself a narrative alibi by asking an ambiguous question: 
" H o w can y o u — ? " (187). But not even Pete will expose Jenny's 
rants as racist, since he clearly participates i n a colonialist per-
spective which segregates the chi ld from the parents because the 
chi ld has embraced a "whiteness" that the parents lack. 
Disley's "whiteness" contaminates his identity, dividing h i m 
between his racial, cultural difference and the standards of St. 
Paul's which will make h i m desirable in Pete's eyes. Pete is 
ignorant of this contamination, this identity crisis, and instead 
admires Disley's good fortune as a colonized subject: 
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The point was, could the white world provide enough to satisfy Disley 
in life? U n l i k e most of my circle, he always had access to the black 
world. H e d idn ' t have to choose, for he could exist in both, have hair-
driers and double handshakes. N o one else I knew was that fortunate, 
had that much going for h i m . (127) 
Pete refuses to see the result of his own colonizing influence on 
Disley and, instead, constructs Disley's bifurcation as an asset. 
What Pete desires i n Disley is his ability to traverse the border 
between two distinct cultures and wear two masks. This trasgres-
sive ability reveals that neither "blackness" nor "whiteness" is a 
term signifying skin colour within this text; they are construc-
tions which function within the constitution of Pete's identity 
and his l ib idinal economy. H e describes the social construction 
of black skin he grew up with i n an attempt to explain his desire 
for Disley: 
I was brought up not to touch black skin. Black skin was unhealthy, 
scaly like a reptile's, gave you T B . A whole country has been divided 
on that prejudice. W h e n I was a ch i ld my mother pul led me out of 
reach of the nanny, feeding me herself, bathing me. (138) 
"Blackness" then is a construction of prejudice; but i f he accepts 
a touch of "blackness," he does so to justify touching a chi ld 
sexually on the grounds of his " l iberal" acceptance of colour. H e 
is not "sick," as the rest of white South Afr ica is "sick with their 
aversion for black skin" (138). Pete's acceptance of "blackness" 
becomes a virtue, a mask for concealing the chi ld behind the 
colour. 
Pete no sooner uses his willingness to "touch" blackness as a 
virtue, a sign of healthiness, than he removes the "blackness" to 
"universalize" the body of the chi ld , i n fact, to make the reader 
think the chi ld is an adult: "Do I need to describe the sensation 
that I experienced as the blackness went out of Disley's skin for 
me, and I felt the person beneath. A l l of h i m " (138). For Pete, 
Disley's essential self—his intrinsic "value" removed from age 
and co lour—cannot be revealed unti l his "blackness" is dis-
solved and his ch i ldhood is erased. 
If "blackness" appears f luid within Time of Our Darkness, it is 
because such fluidity allows it to function as a device of psychic 
coloration. When , for example, Disley and Pete first have sex, 
S T E P H E N G R A Y ' S " T I M E O F O U R D A R K N E S S 85 
Pete turns the light out and immerses them both into "black-
ness," because he wants to conceal more than his colour differ-
ence: "I switched off the reading lamp so that, if I would not see 
his tense, lean body, he would not see my overused pink nipples, 
my gathering paunch. We were more equal i n the dark" (78). 
The darkness serves to conceal Pete's body, but it also reveals 
his fear of the difference between their ages. For Pete to identify 
psychically with Disley, he must b lur the hierarchy between 
"black" and "white" and between "agedness" and "youth." 
V. Consenting Youths 
Pete seeks to dissolve the binary of age/youth by rationalizing 
that if a chi ld is mature enough to be a revolutionary (and o ld 
enough to be ki l led by the government) then he is mature and 
o ld enough to be a lover. Fai l ing to recognize his own double 
standard, Pete rails against the hypocrisy of apartheid, echoed in 
Andre's words when he says that you "can shoot [black minors] 
in the back but you can't go to bed with them" (33). W h e n Pete 
finally has sex with Disley, he frames it within the prosecution of 
other black chi ldren by his government: 
Why I write all this down must be pondered as well. I can record only 
the following: as hundreds of kids were being slammed beh ind bars 
that night, criminals twenty to a cell , asleep by the bel l , awake by the 
bel l , to be tried by the magistrate i n batches of t e n — I am talking 
about my country n o w — I crawled beside Disley, eased the hot-water 
bottle to our feet, and stroked his thin back and r o u n d his arse and 
paddled the side o f his neck with my thumb. (76) 
What Pete never seems to take into account i n this rationaliza-
tion is the underlying similarity between a chi ld fighting for 
freedom from apartheid and a chi ld in a relationship with an 
older man: each is subjected to a system of oppression. 
Pete also tries to rationalize the dissolution he desires through 
a discourse based on physiology. H e argues that this was "not a 
chi ld, but a lover. . . . This was not a schoolboy, but a man 
beginning. I wanted to know more of h i m . Like a doctor, I should 
ask h i m to cough. . . . N o chi ld , no schoolboy" (77). "L ike a 
doctor," Pete uses a privileged medical discourse; the truth he 
creates is strategic and uses Disley's thirteen-year-old body to 
86 R O B E R T W . G R A Y 
signify a maturity that exceeds its years: "Certainly Disley had 
been busting his considerable rod for the last few years, and 
producing bucketfuls of splash. H e could have fathered a whole 
new generation on the girls at Saint Paul's" (78). The ch i ld is 
thus made father to the "man," at least i n Pete's m i n d . H e must 
maintain the il lusion that there can be no better choice for Disley 
than himself, given his privilege, money, power, and position. H e 
argues that Disley, this "black-skinned ch i ld had twice crossed 
town for this moment, knowing he would get it" (77). H e conf-
lates desire and "consent," imply ing that a thirteen-year-old boy 
is both conscious of his choices, and mature enough to be 
attracted to Pete for his own unique personality. 
Pete conflates Disley's desire and "consent" i n an attempt to 
exempt the relationship he shares with Disley from the social and 
economic reality of apartheid. The paradox is that while Pete 
argues that Disley is capable of informed consent, he also main-
tains that Disley is a chi ld : "We were an adult and a consenting 
chi ld , making our own world by our mutual wishes . . . only under 
cover of night could we emerge together" ( 123). It must follow 
then that not only does the ambiguity serve Pete, but the faculty 
of consent and the identity of Disley as a " c h i l d " each serve for 
Pete some psychic or l ib idinal purpose. 
The i l lusion of consent conceals the possibility of economic 
coercion and, to some extent, glosses over issues of power which 
are inherent i n such relations of disparity. Kevin Kopelson argues 
in his study of André Gide and Ronald Firbank that this k i n d of 
concealment is a type of "pastoral" project: 
Gide is both repelled by the womanishness of sexual inversion and 
sodomitical submission, and drawn to a "pastoral" project, one en-
gaged in by writers who would like to conceive of the sexual "apart 
from all relations o f power," to see it as only "belatedly contaminated 
by power from elsewhere" (Bersani 221 ). In other words, Gide would 
rather not acknowledge the colonial context o f his sexual init iat ion. 
(63) 
Pete's seemingly "pastoral" project conceals the significance of 
Disley's age while it maintains that age's significance in the mise-
en-scène^ of desire. Pete tells Disley that "we white people won't let 
you be a man tomorrow" (206), neglecting to add that his own 
"project" is to keep h im from ever becoming a man. 
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Pete's desire for youth and Disley's l iminal state — no longer 
a boy and not yet a man—recal ls the myth of Ganymede and 
Zeus, i n which the beautiful youth Ganymede is made immortal 
through Zeus's love, but wil l never grow past pubescence; the 
implicat ion is that, if he were to become a man, then Zeus would 
be made effeminate. Disley's "untimely" death i n the end thus 
becomes very timely, and death becomes the ultimate castration 
of the other. This novel reveals the paradox i n which the pederas-
tie or aged subject finds himself: his desire and his power are 
ultimately incompatible. 
This complex imbrication of consent with childish innocence 
typically operates within and depends u p o n the social construc-
tion of "blackness." For, when it comes to the white Afrikaner 
youth, Prince, Pete notes that what "he wanted was not a sex 
scene, but a home" (94). Pete betrays an understanding of 
Prince's desire, which he does not extend to the almost parent-
less Disley. In a curious way, he maintains a double standard so as 
to preserve Disley's difference, for he appropriatively identifies 
himself with Disley's colour, youth, and political situation to play 
out his masochistic fantasy. 
Nonetheless, Pete's desire to be subsumed into "blackness" 
and "youth" is similar to what Kopelson calls the desire for "self-
recovery" through "dissolution": 
Yet Gide , l ike Firbank, conceives of love, and in particular pederastie 
love, as the dissolution of the black/white (Blanche/Negress) com-
plementarity u p o n which it is also based. The pastoral mode of If It 
Die—the apolitical and nonpederastic egalitarianism, the face à face 
sexual preference, the attempt to pass himself off as non-exploitive, 
as something other than a sexual tour i s t—should , in fact, be traced 
to this investment i n erotic dissolution . . . Love, for Gide, is self-loss, 
(white) subject/ (black) other merger. After love, as he imagined 
both Wilde and Verlaine realized, comes "self-recovery." (66) 
This desire for dissolution of the black/white binary and for 
being subsumed into "blackness" and youth are all part of a 
desire to appropriate Disley's otherness. Kaja Silverman, in Male 
Subjectivity at the Margins, describes the desire to be subsumed 
into blackness as "psychic coloration" (299). Pete's desire to 
assimilate Disley into white South Afr ica is complicated by his 
own l ib idinal masochistic fantasy, wherein he also identifies with 
Disley as a racial and "youthful" other. 
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VI. Catching T h e Blue Train 
Perhaps the most significant example of this psychic coloration is 
revealed through one of Pete's memories that he revisits through 
fantasy several times in the novel. As a chi ld he is travelling with 
his mother when he sees a black man bathing in the river: 
This was how I first saw a nude male. A n old-fashioned steel bridge 
over a broad, reedy river. M y mother replacing the spoon in the 
marmalade. The coffee j e r k i n g in its flat cup. A muscular, thin-
waisted stark naked man standing on a mudbank, a bar o f soap 
foaming in his fist, white suds dr ipp ing down his armpits and from his 
groin , and he waved gracefully to us, flecks of suds splashing on his 
head and chest. 
M y mother c l ipped her eyes shut. "They have no sense of shame," 
she said. 
1 kept staring through the double glass, at his smi l ing movement, 
the silver reach of the water, and was never the same again. (34) 
The mise-en-scène of desire begins with transgression and the 
black man's lack of "shame" with which Pete, as a boy, wants to 
identify. This scene also provides the opposite case of the desire 
to subsume age difference: here it is a ch i ld identifying with a 
man. The "d in ing car of a cross-country train" (34) serves as the 
space of "whiteness" and "youth" defined by the difference of the 
racial other—the m a n — b a t h i n g shamelessly in the river. 2 
The "double glass," if it is double-paned, is also double in 
its function of mirror ing the double to himself. This scene is 
a metaphor or performance of Jacques Lacan's mirror-stage, 
which, he argues, is "an identification, in the ful l sense that analysis 
gives to the term, namely, the transformation that takes place in 
the subject when he assumes an image" (2). Pete, as a chi ld , looks 
prospectively i n the Lacanian mirror at the adult he wishes to 
become: a stereotypical, primitively physical, sexual, shameless, 
black man. This tension between the white boy on the train and 
the black man washing i n the river is based on a desire that is 
derived from the separation of the two. It is an antiseptic fantasy 
that permits a type of disembodied identification: disembodied 
because their two bodies — their two worlds—are still separated 
by the glass of the train car window. Pete's desire for, and identi-
fication with, the black man washing on the river bank is the 
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primary moment of identification which disperses into a perva-
sive fantasy that saturates the text. 
W h e n he returns to this memory again near the end of the 
novel, it is altered, and, through fantasy, the double glass (that is, 
the mirror) is shattered so he can take on "blackness," leaving 
behind his class and racial privilege: "I broke from my mother's 
table i n the d in ing car, scattered coffee, toast, marmalade. So 
great was the force of my recognition the double glass shattered" 
(304). There is no longer a division between Pete and the object 
he desires; it is no longer that he identifies with the black man, 
but that he has become b l a c k — i n fantasy. The fantasy of shatter-
ing the double glass also permits the return of Pete's youthful 
body, a k ind of desublimation of his homosexual and cross-racial 
desires. The initial separation—between Pete and the black 
man — that the Imaginary relation entailed provided a l imit to be 
transgressed. Ultimately, Pete has made Disley into a transgres-
sive b o d y — m o v i n g from culture to culture and language to 
language—so that through fantasy he may psychically imitate 
that transgressive body. 
VII. Prototypical Affections 
Pete is bifurcated, caught between two itineraries i n his relation-
ship with Disley: he seeks to create a colonized, "acceptable" 
white mask for Disley, while he concurrently fetishizes Disley's 
skin colour. The fetishized skin provokes Pete's nostalgia for the 
moment when he was a chi ld on the train seeing the naked black 
man washing i n the river. For Pete, black skin signifies a "shame-
less" body, a body that can express desire physically, without 
sublimation. H e desires such a body but cannot give up the 
privilege afforded by his "whiteness." Disley thus becomes the 
prototype, the offspring of what Pete both desires and refuses to 
re l inquish—his power. 
Pete wants not only to construct Disley as other, but to become 
the other and thus to imitate the prototype. This desire is predi-
cated on the need to desublimate the body and, concurrently, to 
act out sadomasochistic and masochistic impulses. Silverman 
argues that for Said, "[T. E.] Lawrence is one of those be-
nighted Westerners who, not content merely to construct 'the 
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Orient , ' seeks to provide its best representative" (299). Whereas 
Lawrence recreates himself in the image of the other so that the 
other will imitate h i m back—what she calls the double mimesis 
—Pete's process is inverted; he recreates Disley into a desirable 
image and then imitates that image. Whether the colonizing 
subject identifies with his own "masquerade" (like Lawrence) or 
the image he creates i n the other (like Pete), he is still, according 
to Silverman, " f inding himself within the racial and social other" 
(299), i n the latter case an other that also wears the (socially 
acceptable under apartheid) mask of "whiteness." 
This socially transgressive body is finally a complex tool gener-
ated for the subject's consolidation of the self. Pete's identifica-
tion with Disley for most of the novel is vicarious, just as though 
he has moulded Disley into a useful reflection of himself. This 
identification with Disley and Disley's potential as a leader of the 
oppressed Other conceals an erotic identification with apart-
heid. Pete nonetheless disclaims his privilege when he claims 
that, although it seems "quibbl ing and petty" to mention the 
criminal aspect of his love for Disley, "when multitudes starve, 
more are forced into removals before the blade of the bulldozer, 
but it is all part of the same. We were all l iv ing across the law" 
( 133). In one sense, Pete identifies with those marginalized and 
oppressed under apartheid through Disley; i n another sense, he 
reduces his molestation of a chi ld to the same level as breaking 
the law of apartheid. 
W h e n Pete sees Disley within a context of other black children 
who participate i n the revolution, he does so to point out what he 
sees as the paradox under which black chi ldren must fight adult 
battles against a regime fighting to keep all blacks as wards of the 
state, as chi ldren under the rule of white South A f r i c a . 3 Pete 
reminds the reader that i n "South Afr ica the government ki l led 
black chi ldren" (13) and that under such a government Disley 
has only two choices: "These were Disley's previous school fel-
lows, the chi ldren who had decided o n Liberation before educa-
t ion—freedom fighters, truants and then vagrants. They were 
starving" (9). Pete points to the destroyed schools and seems to 
criticize these chi ld revolutionaries for not choosing education 
but does not seem aware of what k ind of education he, much less 
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the government of South Africa, is offering black youth. H e says 
that "[his] life had been spent this far protecting such kids from 
the adult world, preparing them to cope with it, not defy it" (64). 
Pete's pedagogical approach encourages black students to 
"cope" with the " [white] adult wor ld" but does not reflect on the 
cost of such an approach: the racial other's split consciousness 
and the loss of ch i ldhood without the consolation of adulthood. 
With Disley in particular, Pete observes that at that "awkward age 
between boy and man, he didn' t know whether to be utterly 
obedient or to have rights of his own" (37), but this is only 
mentioned as a disclaimer to prevent any interrogation of the 
sexual advances he is about to make on Disley. 
VIII. Altering the Cock 
Pete's crisis of identity—his nostalgia for his lost youth and his 
desire to lose himself to "blackness"—is precipitated by a weak-
ened relationship with his long-time lover, André; they sleep in 
different rooms and appear to be more like roommates than 
lovers. The problems i n Pete's and Andre 's relationship pervade 
the text, and all other relationships are implicated i n the compli-
cated game of desire which they play. Ostensibly, the novel seems 
to be the story of Pete's relationship with Disley, but i n one very 
revealing passage Pete confesses to André and to the reader that 
there is another story, another desire, running through this: 
But why can't we have one relationship completely our own? We 
do everything by proxy—through Jenny and through the Prince, 
through even Disley. It's as if we can touch each other only through 
other people. I don't care who you sleep with; pray God you don't 
care about that with me, and I'm not even going to tell you half. 
Because it's none of your business. But it's only to get back in touch 
with you. You see? (274) 
The proxy, then, is a body through which desire traffics, and any 
identification with that discrete body—its colour, gender, and 
specificity—is a narcissistic identification. The proxy is what 
El l ie Ragland-Sullivan calls an "Imaginary relation," subject 
to misrecognition and idealization: "As a narcissistic structure, 
Imaginary relations—be they between individuals or societies — 
are governed by jealousy, competition, and aggressivity, medi-
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ated through idealization, love, and the rationalizations which 
Lacan calls 'misrecognition. ' Al though consensus between 
people seems to offer a guarantee of certainty and stability, 
Imaginary collusions continually break down" (174)- Desire 
both traffics the proxy's body and identifies with it as an Imagin-
ary relation, thereby deriving vicarious pleasure—the proxy is 
both conduit and mirror ing image. 
L iza is perhaps the first Imaginary relation that Pete constructs 
in the text, and it is not so much that he identifies with her as 
that he becomes her. L iza is not there to act as domestic/femi-
nine proxy—she is on vacat ion—and Pete identifies masochis-
tically with her role as servant i n their household. Indeed, Pete's 
descriptions of himself i n the first chapters all construct h i m 
as feminine, or more specifically, he identifies with what he 
constructs as stereotypically feminine: passive, accommodating, 
and loving more than one is loved. W h e n Pete tells Jenny Carter 
that "[h]omes are maintained by those who stay at home and 
weep" (19), he takes on a role which has been defined by 
Roland Barthes in A Lover's Discourse. H e becomes "something 
feminine": 
Historically, the discourse of absence is carried on by the woman: 
Woman is sedentary, M a n hunts, journeys; Woman is faithful (she 
waits), man is fickle (he sails away, he cruises). It is woman who gives 
shape to absence, elaborates its fiction, for she has time to do so; she 
weaves and she sings; the Sp inn ing Songs express both immobi l i ty 
(by the h u m of the Wheel) and absence (far away, rhythms of travel, 
sea urges, cavalcades). It follows that in any man who utters the 
other's absence somethingfeminine is declared: this man who waits and 
who suffers from his waiting is miraculously feminized. (13-14) 
Liza is away on a tour of the H o l y land, and Pete has assumed her 
position i n her absence. H e argues that "it had fallen to [him] to 
keep the house in shape" ( 2 ) ; on another occasion, he tells Disley 
that André is coming back and "[he] must cook for h i m " (6). 
Pete's identification with L iza as servant signifies a breakdown i n 
his relationship with André: " A l l I could do was patiently provide 
the normality, h o p i n g [André would] j o i n me again; stay i n my 
r o o m " (16). L iza does not return to work unti l after Pete has 
already moved out and rented an apartment. This is not to say 
that if L iza had been present Pete's and Andre's relationship 
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would not have deteriorated. Rather, her absence provides a 
space where Pete can act out his identity crisis. 4 
Pete's relationship with Jenny, a fellow teacher, is nonetheless 
a crucible in which his usual constructions of gender are chal-
lenged. It is dur ing whatjenny calls "a good hen's night out" (21) 
that the two identify with each other as "feminized" subjects. It is 
then that Pete identifies himself as the one who waits at home 
and declares through desire "something feminine." Pete eventu-
ally thinks that a sex scene between h i m and Jenny is her version 
of a "moral rescue operation, trying to turn gays into straights. It 
has to do with [her] own sexuality, both Andre 's or [his]. If [she] 
was happy with L e o n , [she] would not try to alleviate [her] 
misery by converting others to [her] way of l i fe" (248). Even in 
the moment of seduction—where he is more like a chi ld i n his 
fear and inexperience than he ever is with Dis ley—he preserves a 
clear psychological distance from Jenny's body: "I don't think I 
can go right i n there. D o n ' t y o u see how funny this k ind of sex is, 
that the whole of the human race has to crash around like this?" 
(219).5 
Psychically, this scene i n which Jenny is degraded and Pete's 
masculinity is affirmed serves to redefine his ego; masculinity is 
no longer something he must rely o n an external object to 
produce. Such a psychological reading is anticipated and sub-
stantiated by an earlier sex scene with Prince, Andre's lover, i n 
which Pete penetrates h i m . W h e n describing the scene, Pete 
notes that this is "what it was all about—conf i rming [their] 
manhood" (176). H e describes how he fucked Prince while 
"gathered inside [him] at burning point was anger, rage, despair 
like acid, rotten dreams, rancid desire" ( 176). Pete equates the 
act of penetration with a masculinity which finds its genesis in a 
sadistic desire to violate and humiliate, to dominate the abject, 
" feminized" object. Such "confirmation" of his masculinity en-
ables h i m the freedom to express what he has been suppressing 
in his relationship with André: his anger, his corporeal desire, 
and his sadomasochistic impulses. 
The sex scene with Jenny also reconstructs Pete's phallic power 
and irrevocably changes his identity. A t first he says that he "felt 
vaguely used, but reasonably heroic" (221) but then reveals 
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that he has become "robust and macho like other m e n " (231). 
Strangely, he also describes this psychic transformation as having 
physiological implications: " M y cock was a completely different 
shape now" (2 2 2). Pete conflates penis and phallus into one, and 
this process s ignif ies—on the psychic leve l—an integration of 
the sadomasochistic object choice into his ego. 
Following the sex scenes with Prince and Jenny is a second sex 
scene with Prince which seems to correspond inversely to the first 
two. Indeed, within the binary of penetrator and penetrated that 
Pete constructs i n order to define masculinity, it is simply an 
inversion: Prince and Jenny are fucked i n the first two scenes 
while Pete is in the third. However, a closer analysis reveals that 
for Pete all three scenes are imbricated—Pete plays out a similar 
desire in each. 
IX. Pete Plays With Himself 
Pete's sexual scenes with Prince and Jenny involve parallel pro-
cesses: the aesthetic desublimation of the corporeal body and 
the realization of his (sado) masochistic desire. Silverman says 
that "[Freud] suggests that throughout life the subject is able to 
relinquish a love-object only by incorporating i t—that ' identi-
fication is the sole condit ion under which the id can give up its 
objects'" (317). Freud repeatedly demonstrates this promot ion 
of self-love in Thomas Woodrow Wilson: "Identification seeks to 
satisfy the instinctive desire by transforming the Ego itself into 
the desired object, so that the self represents both the desiring 
subject and the desired object" (43). This transformation pro-
motes a narcissism, which rejects the other and privileges an 
Imaginary economy. It is a profound type of narcissism which 
Silverman terms "reflexive masochism," where within "the l ib idi -
nal economy the ego itself assumes the partial status of a tyran-
nical ideal" (324-25). This "reflexive masochism," Silverman 
argues, " i n its maintenance of the active, masculine position, can 
best be seen as a defense against the castrating consequences of 
feminine masochism. As a number of important passages sug-
gest, it is compatible w i t h — i n d e e d , perhaps a prerequisite f o r — 
extreme viril ity" (327). Pete develops this "reflexive masochism" 
through an incorporation of the sadomasochistic object and a 
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continued identification with those he sees as stereotypically 
feminine and masochistic: Prince, whose masculinity is castrated 
when he is penetrated by Pete; and Jenny, who cannot escape a 
masochism which Pete considers "physiologically" determined. 
T h r o u g h these "feminine" and masochistic others Pete negoti-
ates his own identity and seeks to consolidate the proxies which 
operate between himself and André. 
This reflexive masochism is performed most explicitly in the 
last sex scene between Pete and Prince. Pete confesses just before 
the sexual act that he feels segregated from pain: "Sometimes I 
feel I 'm l iv ing behind glass—very thick glass, the k ind you get for 
windshields or i n aquariums. I know that others are feeling pain, 
out there. Inside myself—nothing. Something must break right 
through me" (290). Pete's segregation from pain signifies an 
inability to identify with what he considers the role of women: 
"There's something inside every woman that wants to be a mar-
tyr" (279). 
H e returns to the position of the abject, " feminized" other only 
after he has experienced and incorporated the sadomasochistic 
role. The last sex scene with Prince represents Pete's transition to 
an ambivalent identification, where he is caught between his own 
sadomasochistic and masochistic impulses. Prince is little more 
than an agent to this ambivalent desire: 
" P r i n c e — " I gagged—"just fuck me to death. It's your turn, see?" 
' Y o u haven't got any vaseline," he said. 
"I don ' t need it. Just do it. I want it to hurt, badly." (292) 
The most violent and abject part of this scene involves the two of 
them i n front of a mirror i n a reenactment of the narcissus myth. 
This myth becomes a metaphor for the psychic and erotic pro-
cesses i n which Pete and Prince—as Pete's proxy—are involved: 
T h e n his face came up to meet mine in the mirror. H e looked 
apologetic, and I winked. We were both covered i n o i l , st inking, snot 
dangl ing l ike a p lumbl ine from one of his nostrils. H e sniffed, wiped 
it on my shoulder. "Sorry," he said. (294) 
What is held i n the mirror is an image of Pete's reflexive masoch-
ism and desublimation of the (sado)masochistic body, both of 
which wil l signify a refusal of otherness and a final refusal of 
proxies. 
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Ultimately, Pete's (sado) masochistic body is a metonym of the 
larger corpus of the nation. His violent sexual experience with 
Prince parallels the violence occurring all across the nation: 
This time tomorrow Jenny would be over the Atlantic, strapped in a 
seat, heading through turbulence. Disley had a cow's horn up his 
rear, funnelling herbs in hot water. What difference did it make? 
Others had electrodes wound around their balls, knife blaces enter-
ing their ribs, stones crushing their foreheads. I had Prince, clasping 
me now so that my spine would crack. (293) 
W h e n Pete demands his own penetration, he does so out of a 
desire to identify with Jenny, Disley, and a whole nation of victims 
under apartheid. 
X . H a p p y E n d i n g s ? 
In his attempts to create in Disley a prototype of his own ideal — 
an other who facilitates the dissolution of the age and colour 
binaries—Pete refuses to see his own lack of empathy and the 
effects it has on Disley. There is a flatness to the ending of the 
novel, a lack of feeling concerning Disley's death. Pete has recog-
nized himself i n the o t h e r — i n Dis ley—butwhen he destroys the 
double-paned glass, he no longer has any use for Disley—as 
proxy or otherwise. Pete characteristically argues that this disso-
lut ion of the black/white binary is evidence of his " l iberalism," 
but he has shattered the dividing glass so that he can incorporate 
the symbolic other into his own identity and so refuse otherness; 
his narcissism is finally absorbed i n his white privilege. 
Pete's psychic development i n Stephen Gray's novel has 
required the use of proxies who have facilitated a narcissistic 
exploration of his own sadomasochism and masochism: an ex-
ploration perhaps predicated òn his desire for a move towards a 
desublimation which would save h i m from his perpetually unsat-
isfied idealism. The novel ends after Jenny is deported, Disley is 
ki l led, and Prince is put on the train home, where he will have to 
j o i n the army. 6 These scenes signify the resolution of the process 
whereby Pete and André remove the proxies they have employed 
i n the trafficking of their desire — the removal of all significant 
otherness. It is a process ended only by the development of Pete's 
narcissism to a state of reflexive-masochism. Al though this may 
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be a "happy ending" for Pete and Andre 's relationship, the cost 
to the others i n the novel is great. By far the greatest price is paid 
by Disley, the proxy with a difference, who must die to fulf i l l his 
role. 
N O T E S 
1 The term "mise-en-scène" in English translates as "production" but primarily in 
the theatrical sense, although Kaja Silverman seems to use the untranslated term to 
produce an ambiguity which could include economic "production." 
2 O n the train, Pete's mobility is another marker of privilege which is métonymie for 
the privilege he derives from his psychic mobility elsewhere in the text. My thanks 
to Guy Beauregard for suggesting this. 
Ä In one of the few articles on Gray, Shaun de Waal reports that "Gray has said that an 
element he wished to thematize in the novel was the proposition that the entire 
impetus of the uprising in South Africa in the mid-1980s, during which children 
assumed the role of adults and adults became, to say the least, vindictively childish, 
should be acted out literally" (240). 
4 What is also interesting to note is the gender privilege which apartheid offers to a 
gay household—and perhaps any household—since apartheid provides the eco-
nomic privilege of keeping household help. H i r i n g help can prevent either party 
from identifying with what has been typically constructed as undervalued, subordi-
nate, servile, feminized work. 
5 de Waal claims that "this sexually explicit episode is played mostly for laughs" 
(240), and that in "an almost satirical way, thus, Gray turns the heterosexual 
encounter into a symbol of abnormality" (240). What de Waal does not recognize 
is that all sexual relations with adults in the novel are constructed as "abnormal" 
insofar as the other is humiliated, degraded and figured in all his/her abject 
corporeality. 
6 Prince is the only one Pete and André will see again, and this is only mentioned in a 
Persky-esque epilogue that affirms the power of the narrator: " O n weekends when 
he has passes [from the army], he hitches to us to drink it up and play musical beds. 
. . . Mostly the three of us chaff around, being friends" (296). The epilogue seems 
frivolous and reflects the manner in which Prince's significance has diminished. 
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